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Abstract: While existing cross-country studies on political budget cycles rely on annual data, we build a 
panel with quarterly and monthly data from Latin American and OECD countries over the 1980-2005 
period. Disaggregated data allow to center the electoral year more precisely, and show the effects are 
concentrated in a three-quarter window around elections. Cycles are statistically significant only in Latin 
America, but the pattern is similar to OECD countries:  the budget surplus/GDP ratio falls in the election 
period and rises in the post-election period. In line with the logic of rational opportunistic manipulation, 
these effects cancel out. 
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While Latin America is often associated to populism, we explore here whether 
democratic governments in the region fit a pattern of rational opportunistic manipulation 
(Nordhaus 1975). Increasing the budget deficit in electoral years without concern for 
future consequences can be described as populism. Rational opportunistic manipulation 
implies instead that the government will correct the budget deficit after elections to avoid 
adverse long-term consequences. 
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Nordhaus (1975), in his analysis of political business cycles, has a framework where 
the policy stimulus applied before elections is reversed afterwards.
1 When Tufte (1978) 
and Frey and Schneider (1978a,b) extend the discussion to political budget cycles 
(PBCs), they solely focus on the pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal policy instruments. 
This approach has dominated the literature on PBCs, where most of the recent and 
representative cross-country studies exclusively concentrate on expansive fiscal policies 
in the election year, e.g., Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006). 
On the side of monetary policy, however, the Nordhaus (1975) framework implies that 
the corrective measures applied after elections prevent long-run consequences for 
inflation, which differs from a policy where inflation is permanently increased. What 
corresponds to this on the side of fiscal policy is a contractive fiscal policy after elections, 
to not leave a permanent impact on public debt due to the expansive fiscal policy before 
elections. 
A series of papers indeed take this second approach. Ames (1987) studies post-
electoral effects systematically, finding that government expenditures in Latin America 
not only rise the year of elections, but also fall afterwards. Persson and Tabellini (2003), 
for a wide panel of countries, and Alt and Lassen (2006a), for OECD countries, also 
detect fiscal contractions the year after elections. Schuknecht (1996), in a study of 35 
developing countries, posits that the fiscal expansion in electoral years is corrected the 
post-electoral year, a restriction that Streb, Lema and Torrens (2009) are not able to reject 
for the Brender and Drazen (2005) dataset. However, a drawback of the studies with 
                                                 
1 Policy manipulation leads to lower unemployment as elections approach, increasing inflation in the 
process; after elections the victor raises unemployment to combat inflation (Nordhaus 1975, p. 184).    3 
cross-country panels is the use of annual data, which leads to imprecise estimates of the 
pre- and post-electoral effects. 
What are the consequences of temporal aggregation? As Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 
(2004) point out in their study of Russia using monthly data, if the sign of policies is 
reversed after elections, low frequency data may mask PBCs because the effects cancel 
out. Furthermore, since elections take place between January and December, annual data 
do not allow to identify the electoral year well. To get around this problem, instead of the 
rule of the year sometimes the rule of the semester is used, by which the previous year is 
counted as the election year when elections are before July (Barberia and Avelino 2009). 
More complicated schemes have also been proposed (Schuknecht 1996). 
Our contribution is to tackle the effects of temporal aggregation on political budget 
cycles directly. We go beyond annual data, using quarterly and monthly data to center the 
electoral year more precisely, with a cross-country panel that covers both Latin America 
and the OECD over the 1980-2005 period. Since quarterly and monthly GDP data are not 
available, we use higher frequency data on imports to distribute annual GDP figures 
within the year.  
Another open question is whether a one-year window around elections is not too wide, 
so we look within this electoral window to detect which quarters have significant 
electoral effects. Monthly data additionally allow to distinguish between the period up to 
elections, the start of the new term in office, and the interlude (if any) between elections 
and the inauguration of the new administration. 
Following the literature on aggregate PBCs, we concentrate on the budget surplus 
because it is often the most sensitive indicator of aggregate cycles. This is in part due to   4 
the fact that it captures both the surge of expenditures and the fall in taxes before 
elections already discussed by Tufte (1978) and Frey and Schneider (1978a). It might 
also be due to a smaller level of noise in the budget surplus series.  
Section II describes the dataset and econometric specification. Section III presents the 
results for the budget surplus. Section IV turns to the behavior of revenues and 
expenditures. Section V discusses the implications. 
 
II. Data and econometric specification 
 
To compare democracies from developing and developed regions, we collect data from 
46 Latin American and OECD countries. We focus on 30 countries for which data are 
available on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis –17 from Latin America and 13 from 
the OECD. We additionally look at 39 countries for which only quarterly and annual data 
is available –19 from Latin America and 20 from the OECD. Appendix A reports the 
complete list of countries. 
 
A. Behavior of the budget surplus around the election year 
 
Figure 1 provides a preliminary picture of the behavior of the budget surplus around the 
election year (year 0). There are elections on average every 4.2 years (4.5 years in Latin 
America, and 4 years in the OECD), so years –2 and 2 both roughly correspond to the 
same point in the electoral calendar. These are non-electoral years, except in a few 
presidential countries where there are mid-term legislative elections then (Argentina,   5 
Dominican Republic, and the United States, as well as Chile for two legislative 
elections). 
With annual data the electoral year is the year where elections take place, whereas 
with quarterly and monthly data the election year is given by the four quarters that end 
the election quarter, and by the twelve months that end the election month. The data from 
the 30 countries is averaged around all elections with complete data in the window at 
both annual, quarterly and monthly frequencies (namely, 85 elections –of which 45 in 
Latin America). 
 
<please see Figure 1> 
 
The annual data show that the budget surplus in these 30 countries deteriorates before 
elections and improves thereafter; once we discriminate by regions, only Latin America 
shows a distinct cycle, unlike the OECD. The behavior changes when we center the 
electoral year more precisely with quarterly and especially monthly data, since the 
patterns in both regions become more alike; the main difference is that PBCs are more 
pronounced in Latin America than in the OECD. Moreover, with quarterly and especially 
monthly data, years -2 and 2 show similar levels of budget surplus, as we would have 
expected since both roughly correspond to the same moment in the electoral calendar. 
 
B. Variables in dataset 
 
Table 1 has the definition and sources of the variables we use in our econometric 
estimates. The fiscal and GDP data are from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics,   6 
while the population figures are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
The information on democratic periods is from the Polity IV Project. The electoral 
calendar for the 1994-2004 period comes from the Center on Democratic Performance at 
Binghamton University, SUNY, complemented for earlier years by the D. Nohlen  (coor.) 
et al. Enciclopedia electoral de América Latina y el Caribe (Instituto Interamericano de 
Derechos Humanos, San José, Costa Rica, 1993) and the Lijphart Elections Archive, and 
for the recent period by several other sources. The terms in office for the 1988-2005 
period are from the Centro de Investigación de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo, 
Fundación CIDOP, complemented for earlier years by various sources. 
 
<please see Table 1> 
 
To construct the ratio of fiscal variables to GDP on a quarterly and monthly basis, we 
distribute annual nominal GDP using quarterly and monthly import series as described in 
Appendix B. We do this with real GDP as well, to have quarterly and monthly growth 
figures. 
 
C. Econometric specification 
 
Following the previous empirical literature on PBCs, the relation between a given fiscal 
variable y in country i and year t (yi,t) and the electoral cycle can be described as follows: 




where xi,t is a vector of  m controls, Ei,t is a dummy election variable, tj,t is a set of time 
effects, mi  is a specific country effect, and the term ei,t  is a random error that is assumed 
independent and identically distributed. This specification is a dynamic panel model, 
where the dependent variable is a function of its own lagged levels and a set of 
independent variables. Estimates are run with STATA 10 using fixed effects (FE).
2 
To determine the number of lags of the dependent variable, we take into account an F 
test (Appendix C). As in Shi and Svensson (2006), we control for the log of real GDP per 
capita and the growth rate of GDP; we additionally control for time effects and, in the 
quarterly and monthly specifications, for seasonality. 
Opportunistic cycles are typically linked to expansions in electoral years, with a 
dummy variable that equals 1 in election years and 0 otherwise; we call this dummy 
ele(0). Post-electoral effects can be captured with its lead, ele(1). We test the restriction 
that the effects cancel out, i.e., that the coefficients of ele(0) and ele(1) are equal in 
absolute value and have opposite signs, leading to a pbc dummy that equals 1 in electoral 
years, -1 in post-electoral years, and 0 otherwise (Schuknecht 1996 introduces this 
                                                 
2 When the dependent variable is a function of its own lagged levels, the error term will be correlated with 
the lagged dependent variable. For panels with small T (number of periods) compared to N (number of 
countries), the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) designed for dynamic models by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) is preferable. This is the case of annual data, even though the set of observations available is 
smaller since GMM makes use of the lagged values of the variables as instruments (when GMM is used, 
the estimates of pbc with annual data are similar to those reported in the text). When T is larger than N, as 
is the case with quarterly and monthly data, fixed effects (FE) works well. This is because the bias in the 
FE estimator depends on the reciprocal of T; provided T is sufficiently large, the FE estimator of the 
coefficients will be consistent. The Hausman test that compares the results of using fixed effects (FE) and 
random effects (RE) estimators leads to mixed results: in several estimates, the null hypothesis that the 
extra orthogonality conditions imposed by the RE estimator are valid is rejected; in others, it is not. If the 
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variable). When there are run-off elections, we count the second election as the moment 
of elections, so both electoral rounds fall within the election year. 
 
III. Electoral cycles in the budget surplus 
 
Our aim is to characterize the behavior of “unconditional” political budget cycles –
without controlling for informational or institutional variables– to focus on the effects of 
temporal aggregation. We do control for the growth rate of real GDP, to capture the 
effects of the business cycle on the budget surplus. 
 
A. Centering the electoral year 
 
In contrast to previous cross-country panel studies of aggregate fiscal cycles that rely on 
annual data, our panel allows to center the electoral year more precisely. Table 2 shows 
the evidence on PBCs in a 30-country sample for which  disaggregated quarterly and 
monthly data are available.  
 
<please see Table 2> 
 
With the annual data on the budget surplus in column (1), only the post-electoral effect 
is significant. The restriction that pre- and post-electoral effects are of equal magnitude 
                                                                                                                                                 
regressors are uncorrelated with the error term , the FE estimator is consistent, albeit inefficient. To follow 
a uniform criteria, we always use the FE estimator.   9 
and opposite sign is not rejected, mainly because pre-electoral effects are insignificant.
3 
With the quarterly data in column (3), the pre-electoral effects become statistically 
significant. Moreover, the effects are almost nearly symmetrical, and pbc is significant at 
the 1% level in column (4). The coefficients estimated with monthly data in columns (5) 
and (6) resemble those of columns (3) and (4).
4 
 
B.  Within the one-year electoral window 
 
Is a one-year electoral window appropriate? We examine this first with quarterly data, 
where the election year is given by the four quarters that end in the election quarter. For 
the 30-country sample, columns (1)-(3) of Table 3 show there are significant effects for a 
three-quarter window, because of Latin America; the effects are not significant in the 
OECD. For the 39-country sample, columns (4)-(6) show similar coefficients, but there is 
a significant expansion in the election quarter in the OECD (column 6). 
  
<please see Table 3> 
 
                                                 
3 This is similar to the results in Streb, Lema and Torrens (2009) using the Brender and Drazen (2005) 
panel, which has annual observations for 68 democracies over the 1960-2001 period. 
4 When the estimates are restricted by region, PBCs are significant in Latin America but not in the OECD. 
The coefficients of pbc for f = a, q, m are –0.9098**, -0.6681*** and –0.5157*** for Latin America and –
0.0688, -0.1549 and –0.2080 for the OECD, where ** denotes the coefficient is significant at the 5% level, 
and ***, at the 1% level.   10 
Table 4 shows the results for the 39-country sample restricted to a three-quarter 
window. The behavior of Latin America and the OECD is qualitatively similar, but pbc is 
only statistically significant within Latin America:
5 
 
<please see Table 4> 
 
Within this three-quarter window, the F-tests reject the equality of the pre-electoral 
coefficients for the  total and the OECD, and the equality of the post-electoral 
coefficients for the total and Latin America. To understand this better, we explore the 
patterns using monthly data. 
 
C. The interlude between elections and the new term in office 
 
To smooth the electoral behavior, the monthly dummies are combined by quarter. We 
first look at a window around the electoral year, which with monthly data is the year that 
ends the month of elections. Monthly data also allow to distinguish between the month of 
elections and the month the new term in office starts. The post-electoral year can be 
replaced by the “first year in office”; if the month of elections and inauguration of the 
new term in office coincide, both monthly dummies take value 1 that month. 
If the inauguration of the new administration coincides with the month of elections, as 
is often the case in parliamentary countries, or if it takes place the following month, there 
                                                 
5 In the 39-country sample, a narrower two-quarter window leads to find significant PBCs in both regions: 
the coefficient of pbc for the OECD is -0.7143** compared to -0.7431** for Latin America (i.e., both are  
significant at the 5% level). The electoral impacts in Latin America are stronger because they accumulate   11 
is no intermediate period between both dates. The period between these two dates lasts, 
on average, 0.7 months in the overall group (1.3 months in Latin America and 0.2 months 
in the OECD). If this period lasts more than a month, we can isolate an interlude. For 
example, if elections are in November and the new administration takes office in January, 
there is an interlude of one month: December. 
As to the behavior within the one-year electoral window, columns (1)-(3) of Table 5 
show there are significant effects for the total in the four-quarter window around 
elections; a four-quarter window is also relevant for Latin America, while election effects 
are not significant in the OECD. Once we isolate the interlude, in columns (4)-(6), the 
electoral effects are only significant in a three-quarter window around the interlude, a 
pattern similar to that found with the quarterly data. 
 
<please see Table 5> 
 
Monthly data allow to test if it is correct to group the months by quarters. The answer 
is yes, once we allow for an interlude. Table 6 shows that with the interlude, the only 
exception for the total is the quarter of elections, which can be explained by the highly 
significant fiscal expansions the month of elections and the month before, in contrast to 
the feeble and non-significant expansion two months before. Since all the signs within the 
electoral quarter are negative, aggregation by quarters around the interlude between 
elections and the new term in office provides a good approximation (similar remarks 
apply to the OECD in that quarter). 
                                                                                                                                                 
over three, or even four, quarters: with a one-year window, the coefficient of pbc for Latin America is -
0.6665*** (significant at the 1% level).   12 
 
<please see Table 6> 
 
The F-tests in Table 5 reject the equality of the four quarterly pre-electoral dummies, 
as well as the four post-electoral dummies, for the total and Latin America (columns 1 
and 2). Once we allow for the interlude, the tests still reject the equality of the four pre-
electoral dummies (columns 4 and 5), because the electoral coefficients in quarter t = -3, 
are not significant. Table 7 shows that with a three-quarter window around the interlude, 
the F-tests no longer reject the equality of the three pre-electoral dummies, and the cycle 
can be summarized by the pbc_3qw variable: 
 
<please see Table 7> 
 
Monthly data confirm that PBCs comprise a three-quarter window around the 
interlude, where the significance of the overall behavior is driven by Latin America. With 
the reduced sample we are not able to detect significant electoral effects in the OECD, 
except for the electoral month, that has a significantly negative effect captured by the 
variable overlap, which equals 1 when the month of elections and the start of the new 
term in office coincide. 
 
IV. Electoral cycles in revenues and expenditures 
   13 
The behavior of the budget surplus may be explained either by expenditure hikes, or by 
tax cuts before elections, that are reversed afterwards. However, Shi and Svensson (2006) 
and Alt and Lassen (2006b) model electoral cycles in expenditure as the source of 
aggregate PBCs in the budget surplus, which makes sense if the executive has more 
discretion on that side of the budget. In their cross-country empirical analysis, Brender 
and Drazen (2005) detect significant expenditure hikes, but not tax cuts, in new 
democracies during election years. 
Table 8 shows the behavior of revenues and expenditures, in terms of GDP, for the 30-
country sample. Though the evidence is weaker than for the budget surplus in Table 3, 
monthly data  reveal significant PBCs not only in expenditures but also in revenues.
6 
 
<please see Table 8> 
 
Table 9 shows that when quarterly data is used to build a three-quarter window around 
elections as in Table 4, PBCs in revenues are significant in Latin America, and PBCs in 
expenditures are significant in the total and the OECD (note that expenditures in Latin 
America have a qualitatively similar behavior). 
 
<please see Table 9> 
 
                                                 
6 Within regions, it is possible to detect significant coefficients for the pbc variable in Latin America, but 
not in the OECD. For revenues, the coefficients of pbc for f = a, q, m are –0.1610, -0.4291*** and –
0.3302** for Latin America and –0.3266, 0.4619 and 0.0221 for the OECD; for expenditures, the 
coefficients are 0.7628**, 0.3396* and 0.1992 for Latin America and –0.3388, 0.6758 and 0.2447 for the 
OECD. Note that ** denotes coefficient is significant at the 5% level, and ***, at the 1% level.   14 
Table 10 shows that when monthly data is used to build a three-quarter window 
around the interlude as in Table 7, PBCs in revenues are significant in the total and in 
Latin America (in the OECD, there is a significant drop only the month of the elections, 
which almost always overlaps with the start of the new term in office), and PBCs in 
expenditures are significant in the total. 
 
<please see Table 10> 
 
V. Implications and final remarks 
 
Temporal aggregation matters in aggregate PBCs: while only post-electoral effects are 
significant  with  annual  data,  quarterly  and  monthly  data  from  30  countries  reveal 
significant pre- and post-electoral effects. Going inside the one-year electoral window, 
quarterly data show significant effects within a three-quarter window around the election 
quarter, and monthly data point to a three-quarter electoral window around the interlude 
between elections and the new term in office. These effects are of opposite signs and 
similar  magnitudes,  so  centering  the  electoral  year  more  precisely  confirms  the 
characterization of PBCs as pre-electoral fiscal expansions that cancel out with the post-
electoral  contractions,  as  hypothethized  in  Schuknecht  (1996).  Hence,  PBCs  have  no 
long-run effect on public debt. The fall in the budget surplus before elections is due both 
to larger expenditures and smaller revenues, a pattern reversed after elections. 
Our results have a bearing on the theoretical literature on PBCs under asymmetric 
information when the executive can exercise full discretion over fiscal policy. In Rogoff   15 
(1990),  PBCs  have  no  impact  on  debt,  as  here.  Contrary  to  our  findings,  in  Rogoff 
aggregate expenditures fall before elections, because tax cuts and expenditure hikes on 
public consumption are financed using funds for public investment. On the other hand, 
the evidence on the budget surplus is consistent with the models in Shi and Svensson 
(2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006b), where the reduction before elections cancels out with 
the  adjustment  after  elections,  implying  a  null  net  effect  on  public  debt.  Unlike  our 
evidence  on  tax  manipulation,  in  these  models  cycles  are  exclusively  driven  by 
expenditure hikes before elections and expenditure cuts afterwards.
7  
The evidence shows that the patterns of both regions are qualitatively similar, but 
PBCs are consistently significant only in Latin America –a developing region with new 
democracies, not in OECD countries –a developed region with established democracies. 
Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006) associate PBCs to developing 
countries and new democracies, but as in the bulk of the literature they overlook the 
significant post-electoral contractions in the data. Remmer (1993) already stresses, with 
evidence mainly from the 1980s, that in Latin America reforms and adjustments where 
enacted after elections. This pattern is consistent with Nordhaus-type policies of rational 
opportunistic  manipulation,  where  the  economy  is  stimulated  before  elections  and 
adjustment is implemented afterwards. These short-run opportunistic “go-stop” polices 
stand in stark contrast to experiences where the government stimulates the economy until 
                                                 
7 For the OECD, the weak evidence of PBCs we detect is indeed driven by expenditure cycles (Tables 9 
and 10), as modeled by Shi and Svensson (2006) and Alt and Lassen (2006b). Streb and Torrens (2009) 
capture the pre-electoral manipulation of both taxes and expenditures, but all the adjustment after elections 
falls on higher revenues. In all these models, even if PBCs do not increase in equilibrium the chances of 
winning elections, incumbents may be trapped in them because of credibility problems caused by 
discretionary power under asymmetric information (Lohmann 1998 models this for monetary policy).   16 
it runs out of resources and access to finance (see  Remmer 1993), which can more aptly 
be called populist “go-go-go” policies. 
Extensions of this study on rational opportunistic manipulation include conditioning 
cycles  on  the  degree  of  asymmetric  information  (Brender  and  Drazen  2005,  Shi  and 
Svensson 2005, Alt and Lassen 2006b) and on checks and balances to the discretionary 
power of the executive (Streb and Torrens 2009). These factors can help explain the 
differences  between  the  behavior  of  Latin  America,  where  there  are  strong  political 





A. List of countries 
 
<Please see Table A1> 
 
B. Distribution of annual GDP at quarterly and monthly frequencies 
 
Quarterly GDP data is available for only  a few countries during short periods in the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, so we disaggregate annual GDP data 
at quarterly and monthly frequencies using import data.  
                                                 
8 Using annual data, Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 8) find PBCs in the countries with the best 
democratic institutions (polity index of 9 or 10 in the Polity IV dataset); Alt and Lassen (2006a) find cycles 
in the OECD, conditional on low fiscal transparency (they also have a few robustness estimates using 
quarterly figures); and Streb, Lema and Torrens (2009) find cycles in established OECD democracies, 
conditional on low effective checks and balances. All these studies control for both pre- and post-electoral 
effects.    17 
Real GDP and imports in constant dollars are I(1) series, while their first differences 
are I(0). In general, the residuals of the unrestricted regression in levels of real GDP 
against  real  imports  follow  a  random  walk,  but  when  the  first  differences  of  these 
variables are used the null of a random walk can be rejected according to the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests in Table A2. 
 
<Please see Table A2> 
 
Hence, we follow the approach proposed by Fernández (1980) when the residuals of 
the regressions in levels are non-stationary, but the first differences are stationary. The 
methodology is to apply the distribution technique of Denton (1971) to construct a high 
frequency series from a low frequency series, which is solved by minimizing a quadratic 
loss function in the squared differences between the first differences of the series to be 
estimated and the first differences of the high frequency series, subject to the constraint 
that the sum of the variations of the estimated high-frequency series must add up to the 
actual annual variation.  To distribute  yearly real GDP on a monthly basis, Table A3 
reports  the  coefficients  of  the  restricted  regressions  of  real  GDP  against  imports  in 
dollars,  deflated  by  the  US  CPI.  The  procedure  to  distribute  yearly  real  GDP  on  a 
quarterly basis is similar. 
 
<Please see Table A3> 
   18 
Nominal GDP is first deflated by the CPI and then distributed using imports in dollars 
(deflated  by  the  US  CPI).  The  use  of  the  CPI  to  deflate  the  nominal  GDP  series  is 
dictated by its availability both on a quarterly and monthly basis. With our monthly and 
quarterly estimates of real GDP, the CPI is used to construct the nominal GDP series. 
Since the annual sum of the estimates of nominal GDP differ from the original series, we 
apply a correction factor using the ratio between the estimated nominal GDP and the 
nominal GDP reported by the IFS to divide the estimated series. This correction factor 
insures that the annual sum of the estimated series adds up to the actual annual figure; to 
make sure there are no jumps in the series, we reviewed the annual correction factors, 
finding them practically constant for each country. 
 
C. Determination of number of lags for the dependent variable 
 
To choose the number of lags, we pick the lags that maximize the value of the F statistic. 
Table A4 shows the statistics for the budget surplus/GDP ratio at annual, quarterly and 
monthly frequencies. The Akaike information criteria points to a sharp fall at that same 
number of lags, but the statistic continues to decline slowly as the number of lags keep on 
increasing. 
 
<Please see Table A4> 
 
The F statistics suggest one lag for annual data, and four lags for quarterly data. In the 
case of monthly data, the F statistic suggest thirteen lags for the OECD, but for Latin   19 
America and the total sample it suggests twelve months. We use twelve monthly lags to 
follow a uniform criterion; this is also consistent with the four quarterly lags, and one 
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Figure 1. Budget surplus around election year 
A. Annual data 
 
B. Quarterly data 
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Table 1. Definition of variables 
Variable  Description  Source 
f  Data frequency, where f = a, q, m (annual, quarterly, monthly)   
expenditure_f  Total government expenditures, f = a, q, m  IFS 
revenue_f  Total government revenues and grants, f = a, q, m  IFS 
surplus_f  Budget surplus, f = a, q, m  IFS 
gdp_a  Nominal GDP, annual frequency  IFS 
expenditure_gdp_f  expenditure_f as a percentage of gdp_f, f = a, q, m  AU 
revenue_gdp_f  revenue_f as a percentage of gdp_f, f = a, q, m  AU 
surplus_gdp_f  surplus_f as a percentage of gdp_f, f = a, q, m  AU 
y_f(-t)  Dependent variable y lagged t periods, f = a, q, m  AU 
n_a  Population, annual frequency  WDI 
rgdp_a  Real GDP, annual frequency  IFS 
ln(rgdp_per_capita)_f   Natural log of real GDP per capita (2003 dollars), f = a, q, m   AU 
rgdp_growth_f  Growth rate of real GDP, f = a, q, m  AU 
quinquenium1  Dummy equals 1 in 1980-1984 period, 0 otherwise  AU 
quinquenium2  Dummy equals 1 in 1985-1989 period, 0 otherwise  AU 
quinquenium3  Dummy equals 1 in 1990-1994 period, 0 otherwise  AU 
quinquenium4  Dummy equals 1 in 1995-1999 period, 0 otherwise  AU 
quarter(t)  Dummy equals 1 in quarter t, 0 otherwise, t=1, 2, 3  AU 
month(t)  Dummy equals 1 in month t, 0 otherwise, t=1, 2,…,11  AU 
date_election  Date of presidential election or, in parliamentary countries, of 
general election (month and year) 
SUNY & others 
date_term  Date term in office starts (month and year)  CIDOP & others 
ele(0)  Dummy equals 1 in election year, 0 otherwise  AU 
ele(1)  Dummy equals 1 in post-election year, 0 otherwise  AU 
pbc  Dummy equals 1 in election year, -1 in post-election year, 0 
otherwise 
AU 
ele_quarter(t)  Dummy equals 1 t quarters after election quarter (if negative, t 
quarters before election quarter), 0 otherwise 
AU 
term_quarter(t)  Dummy equals 1 t quarters after term in office starts, 0 otherwise  AU 
ele_3qw(0)  Dummy equals 1 in 3 quarters up to elections, 0 otherwise  AU 
ele_3qw(1)  Dummy equals 1 in 3 quarters after elections, 0 otherwise  AU 
pbc_3qw  Dummy equals 1 in 3 quarters up to election, -1 in 3 quarters 
after elections, 0 otherwise 
AU 
ele_month(t)  Dummy equals 1 t months after election month (if negative, t 
months before election month), 0 otherwise 
AU 
term_month(t)  Dummy equals 1 t months after term in office starts, 0 otherwise  AU 
overlap  Dummy equals 1 when ele_month(0)= term_month(0)=1  AU 
interlude  Dummy equals 1 in months between election and beginning of 
new term in office (if any), 0 otherwise 
AU 
demo  Dummy equals 1 if Democracy Index>0  Polity 
Notes: IFS refers to the IMF International Financial Statistics; AU to variables constructed by the authors; WDI to the World 
Bank  World  Development  Indicators;  SUNY  to  the  Center  on  Democratic  Performance,  Binghamton  University,  SUNY; 
CIDOP to Centro de Investigación de Relaciones Internacionales y Desarrollo, Fundación CIDOP; and Polity to the Polity IV 
Project.   24 
 Table 2. Annual electoral window for budget surplus/GDP ratio, 1980-2005 






  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
surplus_gdp_f(-1)  0.5631***  0.5586***  0.0093  0.0098  -0.0029  -0.0028 
  (0.0621)  (0.0618)  (0.0388)  (0.0384)  (0.0203)  (0.0203) 
ln(rgdp_per_capita)_f  -1.2226  -1.2559  0.1489  0.1418  0.6737  0.6738 
  (2.4649)  (2.4828)  (1.0397)  (1.0342)  (0.8931)  (0.8944) 
rgdp_growth_f  0.1026**  0.1035**  0.1056**  0.1059**  -0.0424  -0.0424 
  (0.0424)  (0.0434)  (0.0457)  (0.0456)  (0.0471)  (0.0471) 
ele(0)  -0.3264    -0.5589**    -0.4382**   
  (0.2054)    (0.2129)    (0.1890)   
ele(1)  0.7406**    0.4013***    0.4036**   
  (0.3275)    (0.1437)    (0.1920)   
pbc    -0.5165**    -0.4661***    -0.4087*** 
    (0.1936)    (0.1166)    (0.1304) 
constant  9.4322  9.8092  -2.587  -2.5701  -7.0971  -7.1063 
   (21.0254)  (21.2160)  (7.2262)  (7.1780)  (5.2194)  (5.2095) 
Observations  627  627  2311  2311  6625  6625 
Countries  30  30  30  30  30  30 
R-squared  0.393  0.391  0.391  0.391  0.288  0.288 
p-value F test              
   ele(0)=-ele(1)  0.291     0.568     0.897    
Notes:  significant  electoral  coefficients  in  bold;  robust  standard  errors,  clustered  by  country,  in  parentheses  below 
coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Lags of the dependent variable: one for annual data, four for quarterly data, 
and twelve for monthly data. We control for time effects using four quinquennial dummies, the first of which takes value 1 
in the 1980-1984 period and 0 otherwise; the other dummies cover the periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999. In 
the quarterly data, we control for seasonal effects using quarterly dummies for the first, second and third quarters. In the 
monthly data, we control for seasonal effects using monthly dummies for the first eleven months of the year.   25 
Table 3. Annual electoral window for budget surplus/GDP ratio, 1980:I-2005:IV 
Data frequency f = q   30 country sample  39 country sample 
(surplus_gdp_q) 
 
Total  Latin 
America 
OECD  Total  Latin 
America 
OECD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
ln(rgdp_per_capita)_q  0.1604  -2.5988  2.7881  1.0622  -2.6117  3.5513* 
  (1.0314)  (1.6579)  (2.7226)  (1.0218)  (1.6511)  (1.7650) 
rgdp_growth_q  0.1014**  0.1488**  0.0319  0.0987**  0.1486**  0.0452 
  (0.0438)  (0.0534)  (0.0555)  (0.0406)  (0.0530)  (0.0473) 
ele_quarter(-3)  -0.1941  -0.2245  -0.1943  -0.1578  -0.2259  -0.1478 
  (0.3670)  (0.5068)  (0.5331)  (0.3180)  (0.5042)  (0.3952) 
ele_quarter(-2)  -0.2275  -0.5825*  0.2759  -0.0956  -0.5823*  0.3614 
  (0.2349)  (0.3115)  (0.4195)  (0.2140)  (0.3097)  (0.3371) 
ele_quarter(-1)  -0.3879  -0.4641  -0.2553  -0.5302  -0.4747  -0.5351 
  (0.3568)  (0.5086)  (0.3961)  (0.3155)  (0.5037)  (0.3410) 
ele_quarter(0)  -1.4097***  -1.3993**  -1.2418  -1.3195***  -1.3899**  -1.1510* 
  (0.4331)  (0.4996)  (0.8138)  (0.3892)  (0.4969)  (0.6291) 
ele_quarter(1)  -0.0207  -0.6069  0.5203  0.0214  -0.6086  0.4477 
  (0.4594)  (0.8533)  (0.3203)  (0.3923)  (0.8497)  (0.2747) 
ele_quarter(2)  1.1715***  1.7203***  0.5177  1.2427***  1.7204***  0.7054 
  (0.2823)  (0.2668)  (0.5001)  (0.2633)  (0.2660)  (0.4131) 
ele_quarter(3)  0.2439  0.7028*  -0.4326  0.2933  0.6998*  -0.1870 
  (0.2849)  (0.3428)  (0.3422)  (0.2733)  (0.3421)  (0.3291) 
ele_quarter(4)  0.1426  0.8269  -0.7514  0.1300  0.8192  -0.6724 
  (0.4289)  (0.5339)  (0.7527)  (0.3783)  (0.5275)  (0.5523) 
constant  -2.6696  12.7618  -24.8105  -9.077  12.8776  -31.6744* 
   (7.1452)  (9.7433)  (23.9307)  (7.4539)  (9.7172)  (15.6764) 
Observations  2311  1359  952  2723  1372  1351 
Countries  30  17  13  39  19  20 
R-squared  0.395  0.363  0.480  0.432  0.364  0.529 
p-value F test              
 ele_quarter(-t) = ele_quarter(0),      
t=1, 2,3  0.0261  0.3620  0.122  0.00807  0.365  0.0168 
  ele_quarter(t) = ele_quarter(1), 
t= 2,3, 4  0.00639  0.00182  0.167  0.00178  0.00125  0.231 
Notes: significant electoral coefficients in bold; robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses below 
coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Lags of the dependent variable: four. We control for time effects using four 
quinquennial dummies, the first of which takes value 1 in the 1980-1984 period and 0 otherwise; the other dummies cover 
the periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999. We control for seasonal effects using quarterly dummies for the first, 
second and third quarters. 
   26 
Table  4.  Three-quarter  electoral  window  for  budget  surplus/GDP  ratio,  1980-2005  (39-
country sample) 
Total  Latin America  OECD  Data frequency f=q 
(surplus_gdp_q)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
ln(rgdp_per_capita)_q  1.0566  1.0424  1.0224  -2.7291  -2.797  -2.8029  3.5224*  3.4658*  3.4445* 
  (1.0262)  (1.0279)  (1.0272)  (1.6992)  (1.7155)  (1.7083)  (1.7413)  (1.7485)  (1.7293) 
rgdp_growth_q  0.0989**  0.1040**  0.1043**  0.1523**  0.1603**  0.1619**  0.0483  0.0578  0.0586 
  (0.0404)  (0.0414)  (0.0414)  (0.0530)  (0.0558)  (0.0563)  (0.0488)  (0.0477)  (0.0481) 
ele_quarter(-2)  -0.0968      -0.6554*      0.4393     
  (0.2093)      (0.3236)      (0.3081)     
ele_quarter(-1)  -0.5215      -0.4948      -0.4705     
  (0.3125)      (0.4862)      (0.3435)     
ele_quarter(0)  -1.3228***      -1.4674***      -1.0643*     
  (0.3738)      (0.4784)      (0.5946)     
ele_quarter(1)  0.0300      -0.6355      0.5134     
  (0.3872)      (0.8241)      (0.3079)     
ele_quarter(2)  1.2408***      1.6476***      0.7791*     
  (0.2611)      (0.2786)      (0.4209)     
ele_quarter(3)  0.2993      0.6657*      -0.1163     
  (0.2832)      (0.3721)      (0.3368)     
ele_3qw (0)    -0.6534***      -0.8772***      -0.3770   
    (0.2230)      (0.2888)      (0.3247)   
ele_3qw (1)    0.5297**      0.5699*      0.3943   
    (0.2010)      (0.3111)      (0.2524)   
pbc_3qw      -0.5847***      -0.7247**      -0.3762 
      (0.1699)      (0.2559)      (0.2245) 
constant  -9.0278  -8.8834  -8.7598  13.6443  14.0874  14.0788  -31.507*  -30.997*  -30.812* 
   (7.4946)  (7.5188)  (7.4965)  (10.0121) (10.1120) (10.0640) (15.507) (15.5880) (15.4280) 
Observations  2723  2723  2723  1372  1372  1372  1351  1351  1351 
Countries  39  39  39  19  19  19  20  20  20 
R-squared  0.432  0.428  0.428  0.362  0.354  0.354  0.528  0.525  0.524 
p-value F test                    
 ele_quarter(-t) = 
ele_quarter(0),  t = 1, 2  0.0028      0.2180      0.0092     
  ele_quarter(t) = 
ele_quarter(1), t = 2, 3  0.0014      0.0006      0.1630     
 ele_3qw(0) = - 
ele_3qw(1)    0.623        0.339        0.962   
Notes:  significant  electoral  coefficients  in  bold;  robust  standard  errors,  clustered  by  country,  in  parentheses  below 
coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Lags of the dependent variable: four. We control for time effects using four 
quinquennial dummies, the first of which takes value 1 in the 1980-1984 period and 0 otherwise; the other dummies cover 
the periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999. We control for seasonal effects using quarterly dummies for the first, 
second and third quarters.   27 
Table 5. Annual electoral window for budget surplus/GDP ratio, 1980:1-2005:12 
Data frequency f = m 
(surplus_gdp_m) 
Total  Latin 
America 
OECD  Total  Latin 
America 
OECD 
  (4)  (5)  (6)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
ln(rgdp_per_capita)_f  0.7133  -1.6679  2.3831  0.6629  -1.8136  2.4391 
  (0.8960)  (1.4538)  (2.5819)  (0.9194)  (1.4940)  (2.6404) 
rgdp_growth_f  -0.0428  0.013  -0.1733  -0.0398  0.0183  -0.172 
  (0.0474)  (0.0425)  (0.1449)  (0.0480)  (0.0439)  (0.1452) 
ele_quarter(-3)  0.2130  0.2826  0.089  0.1761  0.2819  0.0214 
  (0.2472)  (0.3026)  (0.3533)  (0.2659)  (0.3204)  (0.3667) 
ele_quarter(-2)  -0.3736  -0.9024*  0.2310  -0.4186  -0.9221*  0.1558 
  (0.2726)  (0.4572)  (0.3294)  (0.2639)  (0.4421)  (0.3266) 
ele_quarter(-1)  -0.6886**  -0.7677**  -0.4570  -0.7311**  -0.7633**  -0.5303 
  (0.3204)  (0.2977)  (0.5615)  (0.3412)  (0.3169)  (0.5821) 
ele_quarter(0)  -0.9776***  -0.9489**  -0.8328  -1.0653***  -0.9813**  -0.9176 
  (0.3385)  (0.4368)  (0.5353)  (0.3489)  (0.4441)  (0.5314) 
ele_quarter(1)  -0.096  -0.5573  0.2033       
  (0.2621)  (0.4432)  (0.3093)       
ele_quarter(2)  0.3891  0.3671  0.4260       
  (0.5479)  (0.9741)  (0.3804)       
ele_quarter(3)  0.6901**  1.0884***  0.2394       
  (0.3242)  (0.3311)  (0.6421)       
ele_quarter(4)  0.4774*  0.7849**  -0.0074       
  (0.2500)  (0.2825)  (0.3244)       
interlude        -1.1175  -1.1818  -0.0167 
        (0.7500)  (0.7892)  (1.6872) 
term_quarter(0)        0.6682***  0.9804***  0.0945 
        (0.2299)  (0.2711)  (0.3077) 
term_quarter(1)        -0.1031  -0.4027  0.1145 
        (0.5649)  (0.9752)  (0.4333) 
term_quarter(2)        0.4455**  0.8363***  -0.0229 
        (0.2129)  (0.2851)  (0.3162) 
term_quarter(3)        0.3358  0.8029  -0.1436 
        (0.3366)  (0.5362)  (0.4506) 
constant  -7.3319  2.4314  -18.8812  -6.9664  3.1929  -19.2452 
   (5.2276)  (6.4437)  (19.9815)  (5.3422)  (6.5891)  (20.4074) 
Observations  6625  3776  2849  6625  3776  2849 
Countries  30  17  13  30  17  13 
R-squared  0.289  0.291  0.328  0.29  0.292  0.328 
p-value F test              
 ele_quarter(-t) = ele_quarter(0),      
t=1, 2,3  0.0182  0.0213  0.2180  0.0133  0.0197  0.2010 
  ele_quarter(t) = ele_quarter(1), 
t=1, 2,3  0.3610  0.0609  0.7440  0.4910  0.4110  0.9670 
Notes: significant electoral coefficients in bold; robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses below 
coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Lags of the dependent variable: twelve . We control for time effects using four 
quinquennial dummies, the first of which takes value 1 in the 1980-1984 period and 0 otherwise; the other dummies cover 
the periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999. We control for seasonal effects using monthly dummies for the first 
eleven months of the year.   28 
Table 6. Tests of monthly dummies aggregated by quarters in Table 5 
p-value F test   Total  Latin America  OECD 
Annual window around electoral quarter       
ele_month(-11)=ele_month(-10)=ele_month(-9)  0.265  0.217  0.578 
ele_month(-8)=ele_month(-7)=ele_month(-6)  0.553  0.493  0.533 
ele_month(-5)=ele_month(-4)=ele_month(-3)  0.636  0.540  0.469 
ele_month(-2)=ele_month(-1)=ele_month(0)  0.054  0.098  0.148 
ele_month(1)=ele_month(2)=ele_month(3)  0.039  0.021  0.262 
ele_month(4)=ele_month(5)=ele_month(6)  0.968  0.377  0.290 
ele_month(7)=ele_month(8)=ele_month(9)  0.663  0.865  0.621 
ele_month(10)=ele_month(11)=ele_month(12)  0.370  0.015  0.032 
Annual window around interlude       
ele_month(-11)=ele_month(-10)=ele_month(-9)  0.260  0.188  0.572 
ele_month(-8)=ele_month(-7)=ele_month(-6)  0.584  0.514  0.513 
ele_month(-5)=ele_month(-4)=ele_month(-3)  0.674  0.556  0.498 
ele_month(-2)=ele_month(-1)=ele_month(0)  0.022  0.101  0.070 
term_month(0)=term_month(1)=term_month(2)  0.504  0.218  0.817 
term_month(3)=term_month(4)=term_month(5)  0.103  0.408  0.437 
term_month(6)=term_month(7)=term_month(8)  0.884  0.686  0.533 
term_month(9)=term_month(10)=term_month(11)  0.475  0.130  0.766 
Notes: significant p-values in bold. 
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Table  7.  Three-quarter  electoral  window  around  interlude  in  budget  surplus/GDP  ratio, 
1980:1-2005:12 
Data frequency f = m  Total  Latin America  OECD 
(surplus_gdp_m)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
ln(rgdp_per_capita)_m  0.6617  0.6897  0.6884  -1.873  -1.8266  -1.8192  2.4159  2.387  2.3662 
  (0.9243)  (0.9151)  (0.9133)  (1.5002)  (1.4931)  (1.4928)  (2.6696)  (2.6655)  (2.6424) 
rgdp_growth_m  -0.0401  -0.0408  -0.0423  0.0169  0.0156  0.0159  -0.1721  -0.1676  -0.1738 
  (0.0479)  (0.0470)  (0.0475)  (0.0436)  (0.0435)  (0.0438)  (0.1448)  (0.1429)  (0.1466) 
ele_quarter(-2)  -0.4632*      -1.0074**      0.1674     
  (0.2693)      (0.4548)      (0.3238)     
ele_quarter(-1)  -0.7809**      -0.8598***      -0.5173     
  (0.3301)      (0.2880)      (0.5886)     
ele_quarter(0)  -1.1079***      -1.0766**      -0.9060     
  (0.3460)      (0.4361)      (0.5541)     
interlude  -1.1658  -1.1625  -1.0767  -1.284  -1.2746  -1.1712  -0.0036  -0.0025  0.0669 
  (0.7377)  (0.7377)  (0.7404)  (0.7633)  (0.7625)  (0.7663)  (1.6711)  (1.6733)  (1.7031) 
term_quarter(0)  0.6255**      0.8919***      0.1043     
  (0.2324)      (0.2852)      (0.3134)     
term_quarter(1)  -0.1508      -0.5121      0.1252     
  (0.5749)      (1.0030)      (0.4176)     
term_quarter(2)  0.3989*      0.7488**      -0.0093     
  (0.2053)      (0.2710)      (0.3018)     
ele_3qw(0)    -0.7760***      -0.9749***      -0.4225   
    (0.2276)      (0.2290)      (0.4121)   
ele_3qw(1)    0.2855      0.3743      0.0482   
    (0.2383)      (0.3657)      (0.2065)   
pbc_3qw      -0.5319***      -0.6743***      -0.2471 
      (0.1468)      (0.1799)      (0.2067) 
overlap      -3.1749**      -1.1129      -3.3361* 
      (1.4569)      (3.3275)      (1.8674) 
constant  -6.909  -7.0917  -7.1352  3.5765  3.307  3.2095  -19.0795  -18.8595  -18.7275 
  (5.3741)  (5.3244)  (5.3038)  (6.6271)  (6.6007)  (6.5720)  (20.6270) (20.6044) (20.4196) 
Observations  6625  6625  6625  3776  3776  3776  2849  2849  2849 
Countries  30  30  30  17  17  17  13  13  13 
R-squared  0.29  0.289  0.29  0.292  0.29  0.29  0.328  0.328  0.329 
p-value F test                    
 ele_quarter(-t) = 
ele_quarter(0), t = 1,2  0.240      0.902      0.124     
 term_quarter(t) = 
term_quarter(0), t = 1,2  0.389      0.248      0.954     
 ele(0)_3qw = -
ele_3qw(1)    0.189      0.243      0.480   
Notes: significant electoral coefficients in bold; robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses below 
coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Lags of the dependent variable: twelve . We control for time effects using four 
quinquennial dummies, the first of which takes value 1 in the 1980-1984 period and 0 otherwise; the other dummies cover 
the periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999.We control for seasonal effects using monthly dummies for the first 
eleven months of the year.   30 
Table 8. Electoral cycles in the revenue/GDP and expenditure/GDP ratios, 1980-2005 
Data frequency f  y= revenue_gdp_f  y=expenditure_gdp_f 
  Annual data  Quarterly data  Monthly data  Annual data  Quarterly data  Monthly data 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
y_f(-1)  0.4065  0.4057  0.4875***  0.4875***  0.047  0.047  0.4352*  0.4319*  0.3409*  0.3414*  0.0634**  0.0634** 
  (0.2395)  (0.2404)  (0.1567)  (0.1564)  (0.0337)  (0.0337)  (0.2271)  (0.2272)  (0.1774)  (0.1773)  (0.0264)  (0.0263) 
ln(rgdp_pc)_f  -3.5759  -3.5222  -1.9477*  -1.9432*  -2.4185***  -2.4223***  -3.872  -3.8215  -2.3214**  -2.3361**  -3.2293***  -3.2331*** 
  (3.2325)  (3.2543)  (0.9979)  (1.0047)  (0.8584)  (0.8630)  (2.5235)  (2.5181)  (0.9629)  (0.9599)  (1.1169)  (1.1140) 
rgdp_growth_f  0.1082  0.1075  -0.0162  -0.0161  -0.0252  -0.0253  -0.0076  -0.008  -0.0802  -0.0814  0.026  0.0259 
  (0.0790)  (0.0782)  (0.0449)  (0.0449)  (0.0292)  (0.0292)  (0.0567)  (0.0571)  (0.0608)  (0.0610)  (0.0483)  (0.0483) 
ele(0)  -0.6172    0.0518    -0.1275    -0.1937    0.7402**    0.2955*   
  (0.4577)    (0.1566)    (0.1385)    (0.4246)    (0.2781)    (0.1610)   
ele(+1)  -0.0257    -0.0964    0.2212*    -0.6145**    -0.3286    -0.1834   
  (0.3639)    (0.3074)    (0.1282)    (0.2633)    (0.2439)    (0.2170)   
pbc    -0.2912**    0.0701    -0.1766*    0.1894    0.5218**    0.2350* 
    (0.1211)    (0.2050)    (0.0896)    (0.2301)    (0.2042)    (0.1268) 
constant  42.8982  42.2868  18.9987***  18.9592*** 18.8516***  18.8909***  46.0238**  45.4614**  23.8006*** 23.9552*** 29.5925*** 29.6236*** 
   (25.3582)  (25.5741)  (6.7661)  (6.8320)  (5.0922)  (5.1307)  (21.2163)  (21.1333)  (6.7793)  (6.7663)  (7.8026)  (7.7873) 
Observations  609  609  2187  2187  6333  6333  634  634  2288  2288  6613  6613 
Countries  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30  30 
R-squared  0.195  0.194  0.475  0.475  0.547  0.547  0.214  0.212  0.4  0.4  0.371  0.371 
p-value F test                         
   ele(0)=-ele(+1)  0.423     0.862     0.642     0.144     0.191     0.688    
Notes: significant electoral coefficients in bold; robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses below coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Lags of the dependent variable: one for annual data, four for quarterly data, and twelve for monthly data. We control for time 
effects using four quinquennial dummies, the first of which takes value 1 in the 1980-1984 period and 0 otherwise; the other dummies cover the 
periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999. In the quarterly data, we control for seasonal effects using quarterly dummies for the first, second 
and third quarters. In the monthly data, we control for seasonal effects using monthly dummies for the first eleven months of the year.  
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Table  9.  Three-quarter  electoral  window  in  the  revenue/GDP  and  expenditure/GDP  ratios,  1980-2005  (39-
country sample) 
Data frequency f=q  y= revenue_gdp_q  y=expenditure_gdp_q 
  Total  Latin America  OECD  Total  Latin America  OECD 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
ln(rgdp_per_capita)_q -2.6832***  -2.6843***  -2.2860**  -2.2853**  -1.4115  -1.4096  -3.6686***  -3.6556***  1.0352  1.0351  -4.6309**  -4.6043** 
  (0.9427)  (0.9452)  (0.8946)  (0.8913)  (2.0233)  (2.0286)  (1.1848)  (1.1820)  (1.2431)  (1.2402)  (2.0451)  (2.0445) 
rgdp_growth_q  -0.0152  -0.0152  0.051  0.0508  -0.0928  -0.0936  -0.066  -0.0665  -0.0677  -0.0687  0.0422  0.0419 
  (0.0493)  (0.0494)  (0.0469)  (0.0472)  (0.0872)  (0.0865)  (0.0575)  (0.0577)  (0.0779)  (0.0792)  (0.1001)  (0.0992) 
ele_3qw (0)  -0.0564    -0.3729    0.0949    0.7172***    0.4915    0.8501**   
  (0.2081)    (0.2186)    (0.2169)    (0.2632)    (0.3696)    (0.3157)   
ele_3qw (1)  0.0281    0.4194**    -0.2203    -0.5632*    -0.3512    -0.7232   
  (0.2483)    (0.1947)    (0.4627)    (0.3122)    (0.4013)    (0.5589)   
pbc_3qw    -0.0352    -0.3961***    0.1671    0.6403**    0.4215    0.7805* 
    (0.1991)    (0.1331)    (0.2990)    (0.2535)    (0.2727)    (0.4118) 
constant  24.9595*** 24.9629*** 16.0001*** 16.0072***  19.0024  18.9802  33.7643*** 33.6879***  1.8507  1.8593  47.5383**  47.3253** 
  (6.7361)  (6.7643)  (5.1813)  (5.2004)  (18.0565)  (18.1145)  (8.6649)  (8.6420)  (7.4449)  (7.4357)  (18.4041)  (18.3990) 
Observations  2599  2599  1316  1316  1283  1283  2700  2700  1373  1373  1327  1327 
Countries  39  39  19  19  20  20  39  39  19  19  20  20 
R-squared  0.457  0.457  0.647  0.647  0.427  0.427  0.424  0.424  0.506  0.506  0.451  0.451 
p-value F test                         
 ele_3qw(0) = - 
ele_3qw(1)  0.902    0.885    0.760    0.574    0.800    0.736   
Notes: significant electoral coefficients in bold; robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses below coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Lags of the dependent variable: four. We control for time effects using four quinquennial dummies, the first of which takes value 1 
in the 1980-1984 period and 0 otherwise; the other dummies cover the periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999. We control for seasonal 
effects using quarterly dummies for the first, second and third quarters.   32 
Table 10. Three-quarter electoral window around interlude in the revenue/GDP and expenditure/GDP ratios, 
1980:1-2005:12 
Data frequency f=m  y= revenue_gdp_m  y=expenditure_gdp_m 
  Total  Latin America  OECD  Total  Latin America  OECD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
ln(rgdp_per_capita)_m  -2.4343***  -2.4215***  -2.2944**  -2.2819**  -0.6697  -0.6577  -3.2298*** -3.2275***  -0.101  -0.0937  -4.2867  -4.1397 
  (0.8667)  (0.8669)  (0.9880)  (0.9940)  (2.1430)  (2.1583)  (1.1308)  (1.1196)  (0.9760)  (0.9825)  (2.6257)  (2.5641) 
rgdp_growth_m  -0.0242  -0.0252  -0.0072  -0.0082  -0.0917**  -0.0938**  0.0257  0.0258  -0.0093  -0.01  0.0836  0.0857 
  (0.0294)  (0.0295)  (0.0388)  (0.0387)  (0.0389)  (0.0389)  (0.0481)  (0.0484)  (0.0484)  (0.0488)  (0.1504)  (0.1525) 
interlude  -0.7004**  -0.6825**  -0.4532  -0.4287  -1.7021***  -1.6900***  0.3637  0.3038  0.701  0.7003  -1.7896*  -1.9241* 
  (0.3364)  (0.3283)  (0.3802)  (0.3642)  (0.4732)  (0.4675)  (0.7475)  (0.7408)  (0.7901)  (0.7689)  (0.9655)  (0.9596) 
ele_3qw (0)  -0.2958*    -0.4389*    -0.0643    0.4872**    0.3405    0.6308**   
  (0.1526)    (0.2153)    (0.1989)    (0.1798)    (0.2890)    (0.2398)   
ele_3qw (1)  0.1858    0.2792    -0.0081    -0.1334    -0.3442    0.1016   
  (0.1450)    (0.1729)    (0.2495)    (0.2306)    (0.3796)    (0.1732)   
pbc_3qw    -0.2436**    -0.3576**    -0.0436    0.3030**    0.3426    0.2498 
    (0.1012)    (0.1412)    (0.1354)    (0.1324)    (0.2086)    (0.1444) 
overlap    -2.3642***    -4.320***    -2.0399***    0.6082    -2.4352    1.1852 
    (0.5565)    (1.3535)    (0.4756)    (1.3119)    (2.2874)    (1.6256) 
constant  19.021***  18.9489***  14.391*** 14.306***  12.8669  12.8181  29.539***  29.535***  12.2058*  12.1782*  44.0253*  42.8744* 
  (5.1346)  (5.1505)  (4.7983)  (4.8570)  (17.1035)  (17.2135)  (7.8619)  (7.8029)  (5.9266)  (5.9851)  (22.3120)  (21.8430) 
Observations  6333  6333  3616  3616  2717  2717  6631  6631  3794  3794  2837  2837 
Countries  30  30  17  17  13  13  31  31  18  18  13  13 
R-squared  0.547  0.548  0.56  0.56  0.568  0.569  0.371  0.371  0.406  0.406  0.348  0.348 
p-value F test                         
 ele_3qw(0) = - 
ele_3qw(1)  0.617    0.563    0.845    0.272    0.994    0.028   
Notes: significant electoral coefficients in bold; robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses below coefficients. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Lags of the dependent variable: twelve . We control for time effects using four quinquennial dummies, the first of which takes 
value 1 in the 1980-1984 period and 0 otherwise; the other dummies cover the periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999.We control for 
seasonal effects using monthly dummies for the first eleven months of the year. 
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Argentina  5  1983-
2005  1980-2004  a,q,m  Australia  10  All 
period  1980-2002  a,q,m 
Barbados  6  All 
period  1980-2004  a,q,m  Austria  5  All 
period  1980-1996  a,q 
Bolivia  6  1982-
2005 
1980-1988, 
1993-2005  a,q,m  Belgium  7  All 
period  All period  a,q,m 
Brazil  5  1985-
2005  1980-1994  a,q,m  Canada  7  All 
period  1980-2001  a,q,m 
Chile  4  1989-
2005  1980-2000  a,q  Denmark  8  All 
period  1980-2000  a 
Colombia  7  All 
period  All period  a,q,m  Finland  4  All 
period  All period  a,q,m 
Costa Rica  7  All 
period  1980-2002  a,q,m  France  4  All 
period  1980-1997  a,q 
Dominican 





a,q,m  Germany  8  All 
period  1980-1998  a,q,m 
Ecuador  7  All 
period  1980-2004  a,q,m  Greece  8  All 
period  1980-1999  a,q,m 
El Salvador  5  1984-
2005  -  -  Iceland  4  All 
period  1980-2005  a,q,m 
Guatemala  4  1986-
2005 
1980-1983, 
1985-2005  a,q,m  Ireland  4  All 
period  1980-2002  a,q 
Guyana  6  All 
period  1980-1997  a  Italy  6  All 
period  All period  a,q,m 
Honduras  6  1982-
2005  All period  a,q,m  Japan  9  All 
period  1980-1993  a,q 
Jamaica  6  All 
period  1980-1985  a,q,m  Korea  3  1988-
2005  1980-1997  a,q,m 
Mexico  4  1988-
2005  All period  a,q,m  Luxembourg  5  All 
period  1980-1997  a 
Nicaragua  4  1990-
2005  1991-2005  a,q,m  Netherlands  9  All 
period  1986-2005  a,q,m 
Panama  4  1989-
2005  1980-2000  a,q,m  New Zealand  9  All 
period 
1980-1988, 
1990-2000  a,q 
Paraguay  4  1989-
2005  1980-2001  a,q  Norway  7  All 
period  1980-2003  a 





All period  a,q,m  Portugal  6  All 
period  1980-1998  a 
Trinidad-
Tobago  6  All 
period 
1980-1989, 
1993-1995  a  Spain  7  All 
period  All period  a,q,m 
Uruguay  4  1985-
2005  All period  a,q,m  Sweden  7  All 
period 
1980-2000, 
2002-2005  a,q,m 
Venezuela  6  All 
period  1980-2001  a,q,m  Switzerland  6  All 
period  All period  a,q 
          United 
Kingdom  6  All 
period  1980-1999  a,q 
           United States  7  All 
period  All period  a,q,m 
Notes: Mexico is a member of the OECD since 1994. Of the 46 countries, seven do not have either quarterly or monthy 
data, so they are excluded from the estimates. The symbols a, q and m denote annual, quarterly and monthly frequency.   34 
Table A2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests in levels and first differences for GDP, Imports, 
and residuals of regressions 
Country  GDP    ∆GDP    Imports  ∆Imports  Residual  Residual∆ 
Argentina  -0.0461    -3.279 **  -1.014    -3.193 **  -0.347    -4.736 *** 
Australia  2.838    -2.849 *  0.327    -3.517 ***  -2.407    -2.917 ** 
Austria  1.023    -4.321 ***  -0.394    -4.095 ***  -2.481    -3.87 *** 
Barbados  0.293    -2.589 *  0.214    -3.944 ***  -1.545    -2.938 ** 
Belgium  1.151    -4.566 ***  -0.748    -2.873 **  -1.531    -3.956 *** 
Bolivia  3.027    -1.754   -1.431    -4.077 ***  1.971    -1.523  
Brazil  0.409    -5.22  ***  -0.212    -3.212 **  -2.458    -5.649 *** 
Canada  1.83    -2.947 **  0.817    -3.866 ***  -2.032    -2.283  
Chile  2.232    -2.567 *  0.664    -2.759 *  -2.248    -2.277  
Colombia  0.806    -2.806 *  -0.0312    -2.942 **  -1.999    -3.221 ** 
Costa Rica  3.064    -2.841 *  1.244    -3.716 ***  -3.174  **  -4.406 *** 
Denmark  1.075    -4.265 ***  -0.684    -4.73 ***  -2.429    -4.086 *** 
Dom. Rep.  2.427    -2.882 **  0.0406    -4.532 ***  -2.163    -3.394 ** 
Ecuador  1.04    -4.621 ***  1.667    -3.627 ***  -2.711  *  -7.101 *** 
El Salvador  0.965    -2.701 *  1.312    -5.03 ***  -2.032    -3.436 *** 
Finland  0.759    -2.265   -0.0144    -4.22 ***  -3.194  **  -1.988  
France  0.606    -3.456 ***  -0.327    -4.69 ***  -3.399  **  -3.184 ** 
Germany  -0.445    -3.414 **  -0.306    -4.304 ***  -2.732  *  -3.376 ** 
Greece  5.676    -2.277   -0.36    -3.157 **  -2.575  *  -2.149  
Guatemala  3.434    -1.530   1.917    -4.347 ***  -2.374    -2.51  
Guyana  0.143    -2.599 *  -1.021    -3.407 **  -1.397    -4.122 *** 
Honduras  2.078    -4.501 ***  1.417    -3.353 **  -2.611  *  -4.918 *** 
Iceland  2.061    -2.952 **  0.774    -2.903 **  -2.678  *  -4.454 *** 
Ireland  5.468    -1.293   -0.0648    -6.961 ***  -2.103    -1.426  
Italy  -0.808    -4.062 ***  -0.268    -4.412 ***  -2.709  *  -3.394 ** 
Jamaica  -0.72    -3.292 **  -0.199    -4.766 ***  -2.03    -3.563 *** 
Japan  -1.713    -2.675 *  -0.182    -4.879 ***  -3.76 ***  -2.692 * 
Korea  1.235    -4.956 ***  -1.693    -7.219 ***  -3.635 ***  -3.9 *** 
Luxembourg  0.508    -4.698 ***  -0.253    -3.872 ***  -2.178    -4.71 *** 
Mexico  0.892    -4.639 ***  0.998    -4.194 ***  -3.603 ***  -4.933 *** 
Netherlands  0.747    -3.291 **  0.0002    -4.673 ***  -2.826  *  -3.058 ** 
New Zealand  1.784    -3.848 ***  1.024    -3.587 ***  -2.047    -4.103 *** 
Nicaragua  1.194    -2.337   0.252    -3.952 ***  -1.708    -2.857 * 
Norway  1.368    -2.602 *  0.048    -3.492 ***  -2.246    -2.682 * 
Panama  1.384    -2.647 *  -0.726    -3.068 **  -1.521    -3.173 ** 
Paraguay  -1.02    -4.515 ***  -0.956    -3.686 ***  -1.301    -5.61 *** 
Peru  0.705    -2.872 **  -0.0958    -3.434 ***  -0.755    -3.02 ** 
Portugal  0.201    -2.661 *  -0.682    -5.278 ***  -2.148    -2.733 * 
Spain  3.051    -2.909 **  0.653    -3.752 ***  -2.919  **  -3.078 ** 
Sweden  2.119    -2.786 *  0.14    -3.827 ***  -2.662  *  -2.416    35 
Switzerland  -0.18    -3.365 **  -0.198    -3.862 ***  -2.771  *  -3.457 *** 
Trinidad-Tobago  3.608    -1.423   -1.539    -4.497 ***  -0.539    -2.626 * 
United Kingdom  1.943    -3.177 **  0.488    -4.09 ***  -2.543    -2.897 ** 
United States  1.88    -3.196 **  1.586    -4.246 ***  -2.524    -4.697 *** 
Uruguay  -0.277    -3.008 **  -0.887    -2.668 *  -2.723  *  -4.892 *** 
Venezuela  -1.015    -4.303 ***  -3.187 **  -4.847 ***  -1.177    -4.392 *** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.   36 
Table A3. Coefficients used in the estimation of monthly real GDP 
Country  Constant  Slope  Base  Country  Constant  Slope  Base 
17215.72  3.46  2003  1387.68  0.61  2005  Argentina 
26.76  9.34   
Ireland 
7.49  4.25   
22811.00  1.00  2005  95939931.11  1117.92  2005  Australia 
19.65  3.63   
Italy 
33.96  4.30   
105279.16  4.63  2005  28728.04  0.23  2003  Austria 
29.75  3.69   
Jamaica 
40.04  1.52   
158.24  0.48  2003  14600716.46  107.14  2005  Barbados 
7.03  4.04   
Japan 
21.55  2.37   
678907.73  5.93  2005  5582269.76  902.93  2005  Belgium 
14.81  1.74   
Korea 
5.79  6.64   
1953.00  2.30  2003  275303.29  13.61  2003  Bolivia 
21.51  2.77   
Mexico 
31.65  8.41   
29898.47  2.28  2003  28762.98  0.75  2005  Brazil 
8.51  1.90   
Netherlands 
14.90  3.54   
31331.95  1.17  2005  4548.12  0.80  2005  Canada 
17.85  5.26   
New 
Zealand  20.16  2.93   
1025048.05  529.52  2003  2781.21  6.67  2003  Chile 
15.48  7.33   
Nicaragua 
12.93  3.44   
4877738.44  2525.23  2003  449254.98  24.29  2005  Colombia 
17.91  5.67   
Norway 
15.01  1.68   
114152.59  228.08  2003  243.17  1.18  2003  Costa Rica 
10.94  5.00   
Panama 
6.60  5.30   
61478.45  2.70  2005  772820.10  1697.85  2003  Denmark 
28.41  3.09   
Paraguay 
12.55  2.25   
7395.37  22.98  2003  7173.45  4.41  2003  Dom. 
Republic  8.13  4.91   
Peru 
15.52  4.31   
337.41  0.37  2003  1069992.28  73.38  2005  Ecuador 
9.96  3.17   
Portugal 
21.35  2.56   
3267.68  5.37  2003  3934441.99  119.00  2005  El 
Salvador  13.80  3.40   
Spain 
25.64  4.39   
26466.21  2.86  2005  97606.06  2.89  2005  Finland 
21.55  4.34   
Sweden 
30.96  3.87   
376829.83  2.70  2005  21682.60  0.37  2005  France 
32.54  3.05   
Switzerland 
36.75  2.50   
152256.81  0.82  2005  2010.92  0.09  2003  Germany 
23.83  2.61   
Trinidad and 
Tobago  13.06  1.80   
1830118.09  121.45  2005  41553.40  0.41  2005  Greece 
19.16  1.95   
United 
Kingdom  27.66  3.56   
4933.85  4.03  2003  313831.91  2.30  2005  Guatemala 
20.58  3.79   
United 
States  26.65  5.96   
2727.92  5.94  2003  13177.74  26.40  2003  Honduras 
10.16  2.60   
Uruguay 
24.24  8.90   
18104.39  39.04  2005  5426383.12  1367.08  2003  Iceland 
13.46  4.19   
Venezuela 
15.54  6.09   
Note: t-statistics reported below coefficient estimates; t-statistics in bold indicates coefficients that are significant at 10% 
level or more (only 6 of the 44 countries have coefficients that are not significant at these levels). Following the approach 
in Fernández (1981), the first differences in annual real GDP are regressed against the first differences of annual imports 
in dollars, deflated by the US CPI, subject to the constraint that the sum of the variations of the estimated monthly series 
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 Table A4. Determination of number of lags for budget surplus/GDP ratio 
 
Frequency of     Total  Latin America  OECD 
surplus_gdp_f  Lags  R
2  F  Akaike IC  R
2  F  Akaike IC  R
2  F  Akaike IC 
0  0.140  14.16  4070  0.133  5.172  1931  0.352  21.83  2026 
1  0.452  29.82  3684  0.315  7.896  1828.6  0.731  101.2  1639.6 
2  0.452  28.83  3652  0.310  7.294  1809.2  0.734  97.22  1628.2 
3  0.450  25.68  3628  0.305  6.757  1796.4  0.740  90.41  1611.4 
Annual 
(f=a) 
4  0.458  23.12  3590  0.318  6.622  1773.8  0.740  86.11  1602.8 
2  0.118  14.86  15770  0.180  11.92  7472  0.186  14.19  8056 
3  0.124  14.53  15574  0.183  11.74  7394  0.188  13.55  7954 
4  0.438  38.20  14126  0.346  14.84  6914  0.537  51.43  7114 
5  0.441  36.75  13838  0.351  14.31  6794  0.537  48.92  6958 
Quarterly 
(f=q) 
6  0.450  37.21  13508  0.352  13.41  6678  0.554  50.42  6746 
10  0.107  11.19  40800  0.180  9.680  21798  0.149  8.790  18470 
11  0.110  10.91  40274  0.182  9.364  21524  0.151  8.540  18228 
12  0.357  28.40  37638  0.283  12.69  20540  0.463  25.59  16816 
13  0.360  27.64  37216  0.282  12.45  20320  0.475  26.16  16598 
Monthly 
(f=m) 
14  0.362  27.43  36856  0.284  12.20  20118  0.477  26.01  16444 
 